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IMPLICATIONS OF EGYPTIAN-SAUDI ARABIAN AXIS

I. Motives:

A. New Egyptian-Saudi axis is prompted by mutual interest in creating center of strength to attract other Arab states away from Western-supported Turkish-Pakistani pact and to present a unified front for dealings with the West.

1. Egyptian Motives:

- a. Desire to dominate any regional defense organization which may come into being. Reflected in Egyptian insistence all Arabs refrain from defense plans with West until after Suez settlement.**
- b. Rivalry with Iraq for leadership of Arabs and fear "Northern Tier" defense plans based on Turkish-Pakistani pact favor Iraq and isolate Egypt.**

2. Saudi Motives:

- a. King Saud's desire assume role of Arab leader--**

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- b. Adoption of increasing non-co-operative attitude with West.
- c. Fear of possible Iraq-Jordan union--particularly if Iraq's position strengthened by Western arms.
- d. Strong anti-British sentiment resulting from Buraimi dispute and desire alignment with powerful neighbor.

II. Aims:

- A. New Alignment is reported to provide for:
 - 1. Creation of unified command of Egyptian and Saudi armed forces and joint defense plans.
 - 2. Standardization of Saudi arms with Egypt and construction of arms and ammunition plants in Saudi Arabia.
 - 3. Egyptian military mission to train Saudi army.
 - 4. Mutual defense arrangements--eventually to include Yemen and the Sudan.
- B. To attract Jordan and possibly Lebanon into direct cooperation.
 - 1. King Saud visiting Amman in Jordan, where Lebanese

prime minister has also appeared.

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- B. To present a united stand in the Arab League and toward the West for "unsettled" questions.**

III. Implications

- A. Importance of the axis is political rather than military.**

Unlikely that the military aspect of axis will be implemented.

- 1. Egypt not in position to make notable contribution**

to Saudi armed forces.

- 2. Saudi army negligible as modern force, e.g. possesses**

only 12 light artillery guns.

- B. Egyptian-Saudi pressure can be expected on Iraq through**

Arab League and other diplomatic channels to prevent its joining Turkish-Pakistani pact.

- C. Increased propaganda against any Arab state aligning itself**

with the West and promotion of the Arab League collective security pact.

**D. Newly formed axis might, however, disappear with settle-
ment of Suez base. Egypt would then be more inclined to
work with West in order to obtain military assistance.
Would probably permit Saudi Arabia to drift alone.**

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